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Punishment, Democracy, and Victims
MICHAEL M. O’HEAR
Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School
Editor, Federal Sentencing Reporter
Through its passage of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act in 2004, Congress has responded once again
to longstanding demands that the federal criminal justice system be made more attentive to the
interests of victims, as Congress has done with some regularity since the early 1980s.1 Although
many questions remain as to how precisely it will be interpreted and implemented, the new statute is
likely to strengthen long-term trends towards a more robust role for victims in American criminal
procedure. Victims first emerged as a potent, organized political force in the 1970s.2 Between 1982
and 2004, Congress adopted at least seven significant pieces of victims’ rights legislation.3 Many
states acted even more quickly and aggressively in embracing victims’ rights.4 Boosting these trends,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of victim impact evidence for capital sentencing pur-
poses in 1991.5 As the public was recently reminded during the sentencing of Zacarias Moussaoui,
“VIE” has since become an emotionally charged focal point of the penalty phase in many capital cases.
Victims’ rights groups have already won a notable victory in their efforts to build on their success
in securing passage of the CVRA. Earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Kenna v. District Court
that the CVRA gives victims a right to speak at sentencing, mirroring the defendant’s right to
allocute.6 Also in the works are victim-related amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,7 the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,8 and the American Bar Association’s Fair Treatment Guidelines
for Crime Victims and Witnesses.9 Looming over all of these initiatives is the promise—or threat,
depending on your perspective—of victims’ rights proponents to renew their earlier efforts to amend
the Constitution should the CVRA prove insufficiently protective of victim interests.10
In light of these recent and pending developments, FSR is devoting two consecutive issues to the
role of victims in sentencing. The present issue focuses on VIE, the CVRA, and Kenna. The next
issue looks beyond the CVRA and considers future directions for the victims’ rights movement. In
these Editor’s Observations, I identify and comment on some of the leading concerns raised by the
articles in this issue. I suggest that enhanced victim participation may be viewed as both a product
and an embodiment of the “democratization” of sentencing. Injecting victims’ voices and concerns
into the sentencing process is capable of promoting a constructive new dialogue about the future of
federal sentencing, but skeptics will have to be convinced that victims’ rights laws should be
regarded as anything more than symbolic legislative gestures.
Punishment and Democracy
For the past thirty years, the culture of American punishment has shifted from one of public deference to
experts and criminal justice professionals to one of more intensive democratic engagement. Professors
Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin offer an incisive account of this phenomenon in Punishment and Democ-
racy, their influential assessment of the “Three Strikes” ballot initiative in California.11 They associate the
rise of democratic control over sentencing with a mistrust of government actors and a rejection of the
rehabilitation-based parole model. Although our political culture tends to equate “democratization” with
“progress,” Zimring and his colleagues identify a number of areas of concern with the democratization of
punishment. One problem, for instance, is the tendency to make general policy decisions on the basis of
stereotyped, worst-case scenarios, thereby blurring important distinctions between categories of crimes
and criminals.12 Another, related problem is the tendency for punishment decisions to become swept up
in the symbolic politics surrounding criminals and victims. “The essential element of the way in which
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public opinion applies to questions of penal policy is that citizens tend to express not a preference for spe-
cific penalties but an attitude toward criminals. . . . In choosing between more and less severe
punishments, the citizens will usually choose the former, simply as a way of expressing hostility toward
those who commit a crime.”13 Thus, in the sphere of democratic control, “virtually all issues of punish-
ment policy can be reduced to a zero-sum competition,” in which the voter is asked to decide “by
choosing between offenders and their victims.”14 And “[o]nce every policy question becomes a status
competition [between offenders and victims], the appropriate result is a foregone conclusion.”15
Like other victims’ rights legislation, the CVRA is readily situated within the democratization story. Pas-
sage of the CVRA by overwhelming majorities in both the House and the Senate doubtlessly reflects the
popular tendencies to view criminal justice policy as a zero-sum competition between criminals and vic-
tims, in which acceding to the wishes of victims can be seen as a way of expressing hostility towards
criminals. Indeed, the legislative history of the CVRA, significant portions of which are reprinted in this
issue, is replete with calls to restore greater “balance” in a criminal justice system that is said to favor defen-
dant rights at the expense of victims.16 Whatever its operational objectives—and in some respects, these do
not appear especially well thought out17—the CVRA’s passage likely has as much to do with the “status
competition” between victims and offenders as it does with anything else. What else are we to make of a
statute that purportedly imposes on courts an enforceable duty to show “respect for the victim’s dignity”?18
The democratization phenomenon is apparent not only in the CVRA’s passage, but also in its
content. The statute imposes on judges and prosecutors a host of nondiscretionary duties, some of
which can only be characterized as micromanagement, such as the requirement that courts of
appeals respond to victims’ mandamus petitions within seventy-two hours after filing.19 The statute
thus embodies a mistrust of government officials—perhaps, most notably, of prosecutors, who have
traditionally been regarded as the protectors of victim interests. In opposition to a system dominated
by government officials and criminal justice experts—judges, lawyers, and probation officers—the
CVRA envisions a more open, deprofessionalized system in which lay victims—who might or might
not be represented by counsel—play an active and important role.
None of this is to say that the CVRA is, on the whole, a bad (or, for that matter, a good) piece of legisla-
tion. These observations do, however, suggest a number of questions and concerns as to how the CVRA
will be implemented in the sentencing context.
The Victims May Speak, But What Will They Say and How Will They Say It?
The articles in this issue cover three topics: VIE, the CVRA generally, and the Kenna right to allocute
specifically. On VIE, Wayne Logan offers a thorough and penetrating survey of the use of victim
statements in federal capital cases.20 He finds that VIE has become a routine part of such cases since
1991, and that courts have imposed few restrictions on its use. He closes with a discussion of the fas-
cinating question of what to do when a close relative of a deceased victim wishes to make known his
or her opposition to the death penalty. Such cases not only demonstrate the oversimplified nature of
the “zero-sum” paradigm on which much victims’ rights rhetoric rests, but also raise in an especially
poignant way the question of how far we should go toward recognizing victims as independent and
legitimately interested parties at sentencing, as opposed to mere fact witnesses. According to the
black-letter law, as Logan observes, “opinion evidence” as to penalty is impermissible. He nonethe-
less identifies some erosion of the principle in state courts and predicts that federal courts will
themselves come under increasing pressure to clarify the precise boundaries of the black-letter rule.
The opinion ban assumes that the capital sentencing process should be a logic-driven exercise of
finding facts and applying general legal principles to those facts. On this view, the sentencer should
not be in the business of accommodating or expressing extralegal preferences, which would move
the sentencing process from the realm of law to the realm of politics. One of the standard criticisms
of VIE, however, is that, even in the absence of express opinions, the emotional power of victim state-
ments is such that jurors will lose sight of their law-applying task and instead be drawn into the
political game of expressing symbolic contempt for crime and criminals. 
In their contribution to this issue, Bryan Myers, Emalee Weidemann, and Gregory Pearce tell us that
the VIE story is actually a bit more subtle and uncertain.21 Based on a comprehensive review of the
social scientific literature, Myers and his colleagues conclude that different types of emotional response
affect decision-making processes differently, and that some types of emotions may actually enhance the
care with which jurors consider the evidence. Thus, the knee-jerk, zero-sum paradigm may not be auto-
matically triggered simply by exposing the jury to emotion-packed VIE. On the other hand, regardless of
the complexity of the emotional mechanism, numerous studies do suggest that the presence and con-
tent of VIE are capable of affecting sentencing judgments—a suggestion that will trouble those who
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believe punishment should turn on the defendant’s culpability and/or dangerousness, not the happen-
stance of which individuals are harmed by the crime and how they describe the harm in court.
Moving from VIE to the CVRA, Russell Butler offers a thorough account of how the new statute may
affect the sentencing process in federal courts.22 Even though the CVRA may draw much of its political
strength from symbolic anticrime politics, that fact does not necessarily mean the statute will lack mean-
ingful consequences in practice. As Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin put it, in light of the limited attention
and technical expertise of most voters and legislators, there is apt to be only a “loose coupling” between
the symbolic message and the operational results of a law.23 And Butler makes a strong case that the
CVRA is one statute that ought not to be read merely as a pro-victim gesture, but rather as the dawn of a
“new era in federal criminal justice.” Perhaps most provocatively, Butler argues that the CVRA implicitly
authorizes—perhaps even requires in some cases—court appointment of counsel to represent victims.
The argument serves as a reminder of another way that the reality of victim rights diverges from the zero-
sum, victim-versus-defendant rhetoric: a criminal justice system that is truly devoted to the interests of
victims will have to dedicate a substantial portion of its limited resources to the cause. (Other examples of
circumstances in which victims’ rights may bump into resource constraints include the identification of
and communication with hundreds or thousands of victims in mass fraud or terrorism cases, and the
management of competing restitution, fine, and forfeiture claims against defendants with limited assets.)
Finally, a set of four articles in this issue provides differing perspectives on Kenna. Steven Twist
and Douglas Beloof are unabashed fans of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.24 They share Butler’s “new
era in federal criminal justice” view of the CVRA and regard Kenna as an important step toward the
realization of that vision. At the same time, they also recognize that not all judges share their under-
standing of the CVRA as a statute with profound operational, and not just largely symbolic,
significance. Twist (who, as the lawyer of the victim, Kenna, offers a unique “inside story” of the
case) notes with evident concern a very recent follow-up decision in which the Ninth Circuit held that
Kenna had no right to obtain the presentence report in the case.25 For his part, Beloof focuses his
criticism on two cases: a district court decision rejecting the victims’ right to speak26 and a Second
Circuit decision suggesting that lower courts’ compliance with the CVRA might be reviewed under
the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.27 Beloof forcefully argues that such decisions threaten
to subvert the operational agenda of the CVRA and notes that judicial recalcitrance might reinvigo-
rate the movement for a victims’ rights amendment to the Constitution.
Richard Bierschbach offers a more equivocal assessment of Kenna.28 As a matter of formal legal
analysis, he is less persuaded than Twist and Beloof that the Ninth Circuit interpreted the CVRA cor-
rectly. However, Bierschbach’s ultimate concern is less with the interpretive question than it is with
the deeper question of what purposes are really served by victim allocution. Thoughtfully surveying
potential purposes, he shows that some provide much stronger support for victim allocution than
others. Bierschbach concludes with a call for greater clarity on the part of policy makers in identify-
ing the objectives of victim participation, noting that clearer thinking on this front might help us to
deal more coherently with the pervasive real-world complexities of cases lacking stereotypical victims
and offenders locked in zero-sum combat.
Finally, Amy Baron-Evans provides a more skeptical perspective on the “new era” thesis.29 She
cautions against expansive readings of the CVRA that threaten defendants’ constitutional rights and
privacy interests. While not necessarily quarreling with the result in Kenna, she regrets some of the
court’s language, such as the reference to an “indefeasible” right to be heard. She then offers a help-
ful survey—in some ways a mirror image to Butler’s—of the ways in which victims’ rights advocates
might attempt to use the CVRA and Kenna to the detriment of defendants. She reminds us that,
while victims’ rights may not always conform with the zero-sum paradigm, the interests of victims
and defendants may indeed conflict in a host of subtle ways that go well beyond sentence severity.
What’s Next?
Quite apart from the possibility of a constitutional amendment, the CVRA plainly does not mark the end
of efforts by victims’ rights advocates to reform criminal justice laws. The next issue of FSR will cover
proposals to modify the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and
other sentencing-related laws. The next issue will also contain articles reflecting in greater depth on the
tension between the rhetoric of victims’ rights, which often rests on the stereotype of good victims and
bad defendants engaged in zero-sum competition, and the difficult realities of victims who are not blame-
less, victims who do not seek to maximize punishment, and defendants who are themselves victims. 
As a political movement, victims’ rights has been tremendously successful. This success should come as
no surprise, given the movement’s ability to draw on popular anti-government, anti-lawyer, anti-criminal
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sentiments. What is less clear is the extent to which the movement can translate its political support into real
reform of the criminal justice system at an operational level. The challenge, I think, is only partially a matter
of recalcitrant judges and other system insiders. There is also a need, as Bierschbach demonstrates, for pol-
icy makers to articulate more clearly the objectives of victims’ rights and to develop a policy agenda that
embodies these objectives in a coherent way, even if that agenda leads to places where the conventional zero-
sum paradigm falls apart. This may mean, for instance, difficult reallocations of limited criminal justice
resources, the imposition of constraints on prosecutorial discretion, a rethinking of rule-based approaches to
sentencing, and the development of a more robust set of non-custodial sanctions. Without an agenda that
forthrightly rejects the equation of victims’ rights with longer sentences, the movement will have a hard time
persuading many system insiders that its legislative victories represent anything fundamentally different
from the many other symbolic anticrime enactments that have become routine in recent years.30
Notes
* I am grateful for diligent research assistance from Sonya Bice, and comments on an earlier draft from
Richard Bierschbach, Nora Demleitner, Wayne Logan, and Dan Markel.
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